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Riggs: Constitutional Law - Wyoming's Guide Law: Nonresident Hunters on

CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Wyoming's Guide Law: Nonresident Hunters on
Public Lands and Collateral Issues. Schakel v. State, 513 P.2d 412,
(Wyo. 1973).

Appellant Karl Schakel was found guilty of violating
WYo. STAT. § 23-54 (1957) because he was a nonresident hunting in a national forest without a guide.1 Though Schakel
owned substantial property interests within the state of Wyoming, he was a resident of Colorado. Except for the fact that
appellant was unaccompanied by a guide thus violating the
statute, he was in full compliance with the other requirements
of the hunting laws. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed
Schakel's conviction, finding unconstitutional the statute
under which he was convicted.' The court held the statute
void because it created a discriminatory classification and
did not reasonably tend to accomplish or have a substantial
connection with a valid state objective.
Legal theory respecting regulation of the harvest of fish
and wildlife in the United States has its foundation in Athenian and Roman law. Under Roman law, ferae natwrae were
considered to be res nullis, i.e., not subject to claims of ownership unless reduced to possession. The common law held
ownership of such wildlife to be in the sovereign in trust
for the people. This "sovereign ownership," or "proprietary
interest" doctrine, passed from England to the colonies and
was adopted by the states.3 The United States Supreme Court,
explaining the "sovereign ownership" theory in McCready
v. Virginia,' observed that the right which the people of the
state acquire in "their" wildlife issues not from their citizen1. WYO. STAT. § 23-54 (repealed 1973).
It shall be unlawful for any person who is not the owner of
a resident license or permit lawfully authorizing the same to hunt,
pursue or kill, or attempt to hunt, pursue or kill any elk, deer, bear,
moose, or mountain sheep on any land within any national forest,
national park or national game refuge within the boundaries of
the State of Wyoming, any part of which is open to the hunting of
deer, elk, moose or mountain sheep at any time during the calendar year in which said hunting is done, unless accompanied by a
licensed guide; [emphasis added] ...
2. Schakel v. State, 513 P.2d 412 (Wyo. 1973).
3. Comment, Regulation of Wildlife in National Park System: Federal or
State?, 12 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 627 (1972). [hereinafter cited as Regulation of Wildlife.]
4. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
Copyright@ 1974 by the University of Wyoming
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ship alone, but from their citizenship and property combined.
The Virginia statute prohibited nonresidents from planting
oysters in the tidal waters of the state and provided a criminal
penalty for its violation. In sustaining the nonresident's
conviction, the Court concluded that the ability to regulate
wildlife within a state is a "property right, not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship. "'
In another case, Corfield v. Coryell,6 the court sustained
a New Jersey statute that denied nonresidents the right to collect oysters, while allowing citizens of New Jersey to do so.
The law was justified by considering the citizens of the state
as cotenants in the property of the wildlife therein7 There
the court disposed of the constitutional argument profferred
by the nonresident by asserting, " [I]t would.., be going quite
too far to construe the grant of privileges and immunities of
citizens, as amounting to a grant of a cotenancy in the common
property of the state, to the citizens of all the other States." 8
Toward the end of the nineteenth century the "sovereign
ownership" doctrine still remained a viable theory upon
which rested the state's power over its wildlife population.9
0 reiterated the posiThe leading case of Geer v. Connecticut"
tion that common ownership of wildlife was held by the people
of a state.
It [wild game] is not the subject of private
ownership except in so far as the people may elect
to make it so; and they may if they see fit, absolutely
prohibit the taking of it, or traffic and commerce in
it, if it is deemed necessary for the protection or
preservation of the public good. 1 '
Though McCready and Geer have not been expressly
overruled, the authority upon which they sustained state
power to regulate wildlife has been diminished by later decisions. In Missouri v. Holland,2 the state of Missouri sought
to enjoin enforcement by a Federal Marshall of a treaty with
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 391.
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 552.
In re Eberle, 98 F. 295,
Geer v. Connecticut, 161
Id. at 529.
Missouri v. Holland, 252

Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
(N.D. Ill. 1899).
U.S. 519 (1896).
U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
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Great Britain regulating the killing of migratory birds. Mr.
Justice Holmes delivered the opinion, indicating what would
become the eventual position of the "sovereign ownership"
doctrine.
No doubt it is true that as between a State and its
inhabitants the State may regulate the killing and
sale of such birds, but it does not follow that its
authority is exclusive of paramount powers. To put
the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a
slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of
and possession is the beginning of owneranyone;
13
ship.
The Supreme Court in Toomer v. Witsell' 4 distinguished and
declined to expand the doctrine of McCready and Geer. The
Toomer Court, while overturning a statute that discriminated
against nonresident commercial shrimpers, said of the whole
ownership theory, "[I] t in fact is now generally regarded
as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and
regulate the exploitation of an important resource."' 5
This state power to preserve and regulate its wildlife
population has been held subject to examination under the
limitations of the state police power. 6 The Supreme Court
indicated approval of this basis of state power when it sustained a New York statute regulating the seasons during
which certain animals could be hunted, declaring, "The acts
in question were passed in the exercise of the police power
of the state with a clear view to protect the game supply for
the use of the inhabitants of the state."'" Thus even without
the doctrine of state ownership the states may still attempt
to regulate wildlife as an exercise of their police power-the
general power to pass laws for the welfare of the people of
the state. 8 Modern theory, while noting that the state ownership doctrine has lost its vitality, predicates state control
upon the police power. Thus the court in Organized Village
13. Id. at 434.
14. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
15. Id. at 399.
16. Schakel v. State, 513 P.2d 412 (Wyo. 1973); Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371
(Wyo. 1962).
17. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 39 (1908).
18. Regulation of Wildlife, supra note 3, at 629.
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of Kake v. Egan 9 said that the modern concept reasons that
state control is founded upon the power to protect and regulate these resources for all the people.
Inasmuch as state control depends upon the proper exercise of the state police power, certain precautions must be
observed to guard against misuse of that power. The Wyoming
court, in describing the nature of the state's police power,
said that a recognition of the limits of the police power means
a recognition that "natural and inherent rights are not absolute, but relative." 2 Thus a federal court in Edwards v.
Leaver 2 invalidated a statute limiting commercial fishing
rights to residents or corporations that were at least 51%
owned by residents.
That a discrimination is being made against nonresidents is clear from a mere reading of the statute. The
magnitude of the discrimination is disclosed by the
evidence. It virtually excludes all nonresidents....
No such prohibition exists as to residents of this
State. This disparity of treatment between residents
and nonresidents requires an adequate explanation if
the statute is to be sustained as a proper exercise of
the State's police power.22
The Wyoming court, in Cross v. State," concluded that game
and fish laws were based on the state's police power, and
therefore subject to the limits of the valid exercise of that
power. Chief Justice Blume set down the guidelines by which
to analyze the exercise of this power in State v. Langley.2 "
In order that a statute be valid, the purpose, or
aim, or end thereof must be within the scope or purview of the police power, and in furtherance thereof;
the means adopted must be reasonable and not
arbitrary, and must be appropriate for the accomplishment of the end in view; in other words,
there must be a substantial connection between the
purpose in view and the actual provisions of the law.2"
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 174 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D. Alas. 1959).
State v. Langley, 84 P.2d 767, 770 (Wyo. 1938).
Edwards v. Leaver, 102 F. Supp. 698, (D. R.I. 1952).
Id. at 702.
Cross v. State, supra note 16.
State v. Langley, supra note 20.
Id. at 771.
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The court in Schaket, employing these criteria, buttressed
its position by citing the same kind of construction given the
equal protection clause2 6 in McLaughlin v. Florida.7 There
the Supreme Court, though dealing with racial discrimination, said that judicial inquiry under the equal protection
clause does not end with a showing of equal applications
among the members of the class defined by the legislation.
Thus courts have voided statutes that required all nonresidents to obtain licenses in order to engage in commercial ventures, because the statute unreasonably discriminated in favor
of residents. 8 Taxing schemes, when discriminating equally
against all nonresidents, have been held unconstitutional as
violative of the privileges and immunities clause" if there
is no reasonable grounds for the disparity of treatment."
The Toomer court designated a general guideline by
which to gauge discriminatory laws of this nature:
Like many other Constitutional provisions, the
privileges and immunities clause is not an absolute.
It does bar discrimination against citizens of other
States where there is no substantial reason to the
discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are
citizens of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where
there are perfectly valid reasons for it. Thus the
inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether
such reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them.8
Thus in analyzing an exercise of the police power it has been
held that the law must be a reasonable cure for the evil mentioned.2 It must be noted, however, that the Court's deference to the judgment of the states concerning wildlife leads
to the conclusion that the state would have to be patently
amiss in assessing the magnitude of the evil and the appropriateness of the cure before the judiciary would intervene.
In Toomer the Court said," The inquiry must... be conducted
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 279 U.S. 184 (1964).
Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 14; see also 17 R.C.L. 488.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 14, at 396.
State v. Langley, supra note 20, at 774.
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with due regard for the principle that the States should have
considerable leeway in analyzing the local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures."" 8 In another case concerning
a statute making it unlawful for unnaturalized aliens to hunt
game, the Court pointed out, "[T]his Court ought to be very
slow to declare that State legislation was wrong in its facts." 4
While there may be a presumption that the state has correctly perceived a local evil resulting from nonresident hunting on certain lands, the validity of game and fish laws must
be viewed in light of the limits of state police power. There
first must be a problem that the state legislature sought to
remedy. In Schakel the state argued that safety of the hunter
was a sufficiently valid concern to justify the guide law."
The court, however, found this argument suffering numerous
infirmities, inter alia, that there was little if any relationship
of the guide law to the safety of the hunter.8 " Indeed it is an
anomaly that a nonresident could hunt on state or privately
owned lands without a guide, but while hunting on nearby
national forest lands a licensed guide would have to accompany him.
The Schakel court disposed of the contention that the
guide law was designed to protect, preserve and nurture wild
game by pointing out that the evidence indicated the converse
to be true. 7 The evidence referred to by the Schakel court
was testimony that the guide law had effected overhunting
on areas adjacent to national forests, parks and game refuges,
while the areas in which guides were required for nonresidents
suffered from underharvesting." Thus the court concluded
that the guide law failed the test recognized in connection with
police power "that the means adopted be reasonable and designed to accomplish the end in view and be appropriate for
of this duty to protect and nurture the
the accomplishment
9
8
game." 3
33.
34.
35.
86.
37.
88.
39.

Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 14, at 396.
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
Schakel v. State, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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WYOMING'S PRESENT GUIDE LAW CONSIDERED:

The 1973 Wyoming Legislature repealed and replaced
WYo. STAT. § 23-54 (1957), under which Schakel was originally

convicted." The new enactment is substantially the same as
the one the court in Schakel struck down." Two changes were
made. First, the legislature included "wilderness areas"
within the purview of the guide statute, which had heretofore
only been applicable to national forests, national parks, and
national game refuges. Secondly, the term "big or trophy
game animals" was substituted in lieu of the old language
which enumerated various species. The definition of "big or
trophy game animals" is found in Wyo. STAT. § 23.1-1(b) (c)
(Supp. 1973), bringing antelope within the scope of the
legislation.
Thus the sweep of the guide law is now broader than
before. Wilderness areas are included among those areas
within which a guide is needed and antelope are included
among the animals hunted. The statute remains discriminatory against nonresident hunters. If the state could not present a convincing argument for the voided statute in the name
of safety,42 it scarcely appears that the new law would provide
any new arguments. The detrimental effects experienced as
a result of the statute will still remain. Over-harvesting of
areas which do not require nonresident hunters to be accompanied by a guide and underharvesting in some areas where
guides are required is a fact of which the Schakel court took
judicial notice." It must be noted, however, that the Schakel
trial provided a rather incomplete investigation of the problems the state sought to alleviate with the guide law. Therefore
one would be mistaken to assume that the state could not, at
a later trial, adequately demonstrate the reasonableness of
the guide law.
40.

Wyo.

STAT.

§ 23-1 to 23-147 (1957).

SEss. LAws 575.
41.

WYo. STAT.

Repeal by ch. 249, § 3, [1973] Wyo.

§ 23.1-49 (1973).

No nonresident shall hunt big or trophy game animals on any
national forest, wilderness area, national game refuge, or national
park in this state unless accompanied by a licensed professional
guide [emphasis added] or a resident guide except as otherwise
provided.
42. Schakel v. State, supra note 2.
43. Id.
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Although the Schakel decision does not disclose any valid
state arguments, there may well be valid state interests served
by the guide law. Without a law requiring nonresident
hunters to obtain the services of a guide, there could be overharvesting of game on the areas now included within the
ambit of the guide law. It may be noted that the removal of
snowbound or injured hunters is a burden falling on local
governments. If the incidence of lost or stranded hunters is
substantially higher in the nonresident class, then the legislature may well have chosen a reasonable cure to alleviate a
substantial problem.
It would seem that the state would have to justify the requirement that nonresident hunters obtain the services of a
guide while hunting on federal lands (i.e., national forests,
national parks, national game refuges and wilderness areas),
but not requiring that the nonresident be accompanied by a
guide while hunting on state or privately owned lands. Indeed
no tenable reason comes to mind for requiring the nonresident
to be accompanied by a guide in one area but not in another.
In fact, such arbitrary classifications that have no clear relationship to the accomplishment of a valid state objective
merely invite federal intervention in the matter."
Schakel's trial did not result in testimony concerning
these issues. However it seems clear that if the present guide
law is challenged the state will have to adequately demonstrate the reasonableness of the law in relation to whatever
evil the legislature had in mind when it recodified the game
and fish statutes. If, however, the state is unable to sufficiently demonstrate the need for the kind of discrimination
inherent in the guide law, it appears that this form of legislated prosperity for professional guides and outfitters will
be struck as was its predecessor.
44.

See Regulation of Wildlife, supra note 3; see also, ONE THIRD OF THE
NATION'S LAND:

A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE

PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, (June 20, 1970) at 174-5, noting
Wyoming's guide law as patently discriminatory and suggesting federal
intervention to eliminate such practices.
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COLLATERALLY:
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NONRESIDENT HUNTERSLICENSE FEES

An issue collaterally related to the problem the court
faced in Schaket v. State45 is the discrimination between resident and nonresident license fees. 46 The Schakel court cited
Toomer for the broad proposition that states may not discriminate against citizens of other states merely because of their
different citizenship. 7 In Toomr the Supreme Court struck
down as violative of the privileges and immunities clause"
a state statute requiring a license fee from nonresidents 100
times the amount demanded of residents engaged in commercial shrimping. In describing the privileges and immunities
clause49 the Court said, "It was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges
which the citizen of State B enjoys.""0
The Court, in Mullaney v. Anderson,1 attacked a statute
requiring a $5 fee from residents and a $50 fee from nonresidents to engage in commercial fishing. The Court there
cited Toomer for the rule that states may graduate license
fees according to the size of boats, or to compensate the state
for added enforcement burden or for conservation expenditures from taxes which only residents pay.5" Inasmuch as the
discrimination did not come within one of these, or a like exception, the Court held that the fee differential was invalid.
The cases in which the Court has invalidated unreasonable
license fee discrimination have primarily dealt with license
fees required to engage in a commercial enterprise.
45.
46.

Schakel v. State, aupra note 2.
WYo. STAT. § 23.1-33 (Supp. 1973).
For example: deer, resident $10, nonresident $50; elk and black
bear, resident $15, nonresident $125; big horn sheep, resident $30,
nonresident $150; moose, resident $25, nonresident $125; antelope,
resident $10, nonresident $50.
WYO. STAT. § 21.1-88 (Supp. 1973), provides for resident fishing
license fee of $5 and nonresident fishing license fee of $25.
47. Schakel v. State, supra note Z.
48. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
49. U.S. CONST. art. IV,

§

2.

50. Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 14, at 395.
51. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952); see also Freeman v. Smith,
62 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1932), invalidating Alaska license fee of $250 for nonresidents and $1 for residents engaged in commercial salmon fishing.
52. Mullaney v. Anderson, supra note 51, at 417.
53. Annot., 60 A.L.R. 337 (1929); see also Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 10
(commercial shrimping); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 418 (1870)
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This factual distinction (i.e., commercial enterprise as
opposed to hunting and fishing for sport) may well be a point
on which the cases turn. The importance of the economic or
commercial aspects of these state regulations are not to be
lightly dismissed. States in the past have sought to regulate
commercial enterprise within the state only to have the law
struck down because the scope of the law reached outside the
territorial limits of the state. Thus in Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., the Court held that the New York Milk Control
Act, which established minimum milk prices to be paid by
dealers to producers, was invalid because it effected an extraterritorial burden on commerce and was, in effect, a trade
barrier.5 The commercial aspects of the case weighed heaviest
with the Court as it concluded, "What is ultimate is the principle that one State in its dealings with another may not place
itself in a position of economic isolation." 5 6 The Court, in
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,7 reaffirmed its position
in Baldwin saying that erecting an economic barrier to protect a local industry from competition from without the state
plainly discriminates against interstate commerce." Baldwin
and Dean are indicative of the view taken with respect to
states seeking to prevent economic competition from nonresidents by erecting barriers to enhance the commercial position
of resident business.
While the Baldwin Court struck down a law having the
potential effect of causing economic warfare between the
states, the Court was clear in saying that the same reasoning
was not necessarily applicable to game and fish laws. The
Court cited leading cases 9 dealing with state control of wildlife, distinguishing them from Baldwin because of a "recognition of the special and restricted nature of rights of property in game" and because none of the game laws approached
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

(traders); ex parte H. P. Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 250 P. 1056 (1926) (merchants
selling bread).
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
Id. at 521.
Id. at 527.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
Id. at 354.
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., supra note 54 at 525; citing Geer v. Conn.,
aupra note 10, (statute prohibited carrying of certain game birds out of
the state); Foster Packing Co.v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (shrimp had to
be processed within the state); Silz v. Hesterberg, supra note 17, (game
and fish seasons).
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the drastic quality of the statute involved in Baldwin "which
would neutralize the economic consequences of free trade
among the States.""0 As Baldwin indicates, game and fish
laws occupy a somewhat different position from other statutes. In more recent times, however, it appears that the logic
behind Baldwin has been applied to game and fish laws impinging on commercial enterprise." It is probably because of
the "special and restricted nature of property rights in game"
that sportsman's hunting and fishing license fees have been
higher for nonresident sportsmen than for their resident
counterparts. It is submitted that license fee differentials
for residents and nonresident sportsmen do not have the
serious economic consequences found in cases dealing with
commercial licenses and other discriminatory practices preventing nonresident businessmen from engaging in commercial enterprise on the same footing as citizens of the state.
The case of Ward v. Maryland,6 2 dealing with license fee
discrimination between resident and nonresident traders,
might provide a basis for concluding that the reasoning
applicable to commercial situations could be extended to cover
the nonresident sportsman. Though the Court declined to
specify the rights that the privileges and immunities clause"8
was intended to secure and protect, it did point out that
the clause plainly and unmistakenly secures and protects the right of a citizen of one state to pass into
any other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade or business without
molestation; to acquire personal property [emphasis
added] ...and to be exempt from any higher taxes
or excises than are imposed by the State upon its own
citizens."'
If indeed the right to acquire personal
to which each citizen is equally entitled
possession of wild animals is the means
that property, then the Ward case may

property is a right
and the reducing to
of acquiring title to
well dictate that li-

60. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., supra note 54, at 525.
61. See e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 14; Mullaney v. Anderson, supra
note 51.
62. Ward v. Maryland, supra note 53.
63. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
64. Ward v. Maryland, supra note 53 at 430.
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cense fee differentials are repugnant to the privileges and
immunities clause.65
This was not, however, the reasoning pursued by a federal
court in Edwards v. Leaver."0 There the court held as violative of Article IV, Section 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution a statute limiting commercial fishing rights to residents. In disclosing the reason for its
decision the court said that "disparity of treatment between
residents and nonresidents requires an adequate explanation if
the statute is to be sustained as a proper exercise of the State's
police power.'"" This reasoning indicates that if the factual
situation demonstrates arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against nonresidents the statute will fall. It does not
support the absolute right to acquire personal property in
wild game that a strained construction of Ward v. Maryland"
might indicate. For the Ward case to be so construed would
be to disregard the importance of commercial enterprise to
the decisions of the Court. Indeed the thought consistently
present in those cases where the Court has dealt with state
laws making it more difficult for nonresident businessmen
to compete with local citizens engaged in the same kind of
enterprise is that the states may not erect economic barriers
to the detriment of nonresidents."0 None of these cases imply
that the same privileges and immunities extend in fully the
same manner to nonresident sportsmen.
The legal basis upon which the state may control and
regulate the harvesting of wildlife within its borders is
critical in determining the validity of license fee differentials.
As has been indicated, the vitality of the "sovereign ownership" theory has been weakened. However a recent Supreme
Court decision, Metlaktla Indian Community v. Egan,'" cited
the Geer case as delineating the "measure of administration
and jurisdiction over fisheries and wildlife" possessed by
the states." Thus the status of Geer appears to be incapable
IV, § 2.
Edwards v. Leaver, supra note 21.
Id. at 702.
Ward v. Maryland, supra note 53.
See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., supra note 54; Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, supra note 57; Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 14.
70. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 396 U.S. 45, 57 (1962).
71. See Pavel v. Pattison, 24 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. La. 1938).
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

U.S. CONST. art.
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of exact determination. In the Metlakatla" case Alaska forbade "trap fishing," which is more economical than other
methods, but also allows a more rapid depletion of the natural
resource. The Court upheld Alaska's power to pass the statute to conserve its natural resources by defining the measure
of state power in terms of Geer. While it appeared that Geer
had been stripped of its authority, it must be remembered
that in Missouri v. Holland" the Court had to reconcile a
treaty with state power over its wildlife, and in Toomer v.
WitsellP the Court was faced with a statute patently discriminatory against nonresident business. The unique factual
situations in these two cases purporting to limit Geer must
be taken into account when assessing state power over its
wildlife in entirely different situations. Thus in Metlaktla,75
as there was an absence of the overriding national interests
found in Missouri and Toomer, the Court was willing to extend to the state the broad authority found in Geer.
Currently the measure of state power appears to be
couched in terms of reasonableness. The Court in Haavick
v. Alaska Packer's Association7 6 sustained a $5 tax on nonresident fishermen because it was not wholly "arbitrary and
unreasonable." The reasonableness of a statute, in turn, depends on the aim and purpose of the law. Enforcing wildlife
conservation measures has been held a valid exercise of state
police power.7 7 Both Toomer and Mullaney recognize this
justification for differentials in resident and nonresident
license fees.
Recent Supreme Court decisions appear to lend support
to the ability of states to pass legislation not wholly arbitrary
and discriminatory toward nonresidents if a compelling state
interest is served. In Shapiro v. Thompson," invalidating
statutes denying welfare benefits to those who had not met
the residency requirements, the Court employed the compelling state interest test because the classification touched the
Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, supra note 70.
Missouri v. Holland, supra note 12.
Toomer v. Witsell, supra note 14.
Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, supra note 70.
Haavick v. Alaska Packers Assn., 263 U.S. 510 (1923).
Comment, The Constitution and State Control of Natural Resources, 64
HARv.L.REv. 642, 643 (1950) and cases cited.
78. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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fundamental right of interstate movement. The extent to
which the Shapiro holding will go in invalidating state statutes discriminating against nonresidents is not clear.79 However the Court did say that the holding in Shapiro did not
imply a view on the validity of residence requirements to
hunt and fish, maintaining that such a requirement may promote a compelling state interest and might not be a penalty
upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate
travel.8" In Vlandis v. Kline," while striking down the statutory definition of residency in Connecticut as applied to
state college students, the Court did not consider the propriety of a state's power to charge different fees."
Thus it appears that discrimination against nonresidents
will pass muster if the law promotes a valid and compelling
state interest and is not wholly arbitrary or capricious. Thus
the Toomer decision probably does not stand for the broad
proposition that states may not discriminate against citizens
of other states because of their different citizenship. Indeed
the Schakel court said, in effect, that Toomer would condemn
discriminatory classifications only if they were "merely because of their different citizenship." 8 3 [emphasis added].
Thus, to the extent that there are valid reasons for obligating
nonresident hunters to pay a larger license fee, the law falls
within the category of a reasonable exercise of the state's
police power.
CONCLUSION

The state's power to regulate harvest of its wildlife is
no longer soundly underpinned by the ownership theory.
79. See, Comment, State Residence Requirements for Welfare Recipients, 83
HARv.L.REv. 118, at 119. The author points out that a rational relation to
a permissible purpose would not have saved the classification, as the Court
employed the more demanding compelling state interest test. At 123 the
author suggests factors to confine Shapiro's impact, inter alia, the relation
of the case to the very means to subsist-food, shelter, and other necessities
of life and the possibility that the classification sought to exclude needy
persons from the jurisdiction. See also, Note, Shapiro v. Thompson, 21
S.C.L. REv. 796, where the author reads Shapiro as opening the Pandora's
Box to similar litigation. For good comment on the future of residency
requirements in areas other than welfare cases see Note, Shapiro v.
Thompson: Travel, Welfare & the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 989, at
1003 (1969).
80. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra note 78, at 631.
, 93 S.Ct. 2230 (1973).
- U.S...
81. Vlandis v. Kline,
82. Id. at 2233.
83. Schakel v. State, supra note 2.
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States still have a substantial measure of power in the area
of wildlife regulation. Today state power to enact game and
fish measures is based on its police power. The residuum of
of authority retained by the states under the police power
concept may not be a great deal less than was that quantum
of power held under the ownership theory. 4 The significant
limitation imposed upon state use of its police power is
couched in terms of reasonableness and absence of arbitrary
or capricious discrimination. Therefore, attempts by a state
to exercise its police power to effectuate a goal regarding
regulation of wildlife will have to bear judicial scrutiny to
insure that any discriminatory classification of residents and
nonresidents tends to accomplish or has a substantial connection with a valid state purpose.
DAN BIGGS

84. See Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, supra note 70, citing Geer v.
Conn., supra note 10, as defining the quantum of power reserved to the
states.
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